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Judicial dissents from ideological allies in lower court cases
are more likely to lead to en banc review.
In the US Court of Appeals, a panel of judges can vote to rehear a case which had previously
been heard by the court, a procedure known as en banc review. In new research, Deborah Beim
and colleagues find that when a judge who is an ideological ally dissents with the majority
decision, this can act as a strong signal that something that is inappropriate has occurred, which
in turn can increase the probability of an en banc review from 3 to 17 percent.
In any hierarchical organization, the people at the top face a dilemma: they must delegate many
tasks to their subordinates, but they can’t observe all of their subordinates’ actions.  How can
superiors effectively monitor subordinates?  This issue arises frequently in many political institutions—including
the federal judicial hierarchy. Higher court judges, such as the justices of the Supreme Court, are tasked with
overseeing the work of lower court judges. Higher courts, however, usually have discretionary dockets, meaning
they can pick the cases they want to hear.  While this discretion has its advantages, it creates a problem: how
should higher court judges choose the most worthy cases for review?
In new research, we focus on the role of judicial dissents in helping higher courts overcome their informational
disadvantages relative to lower courts. We examine the hierarchical relationship that exists within the U.S. Courts
of Appeals (or circuit courts), the level of appellate federal courts below the U.S. Supreme Court. Cases in these
courts are heard by panels of three judges, who are randomly chosen among the judges of a given circuit. A judge
who disagrees with the decision of her colleagues may publicly signal her disagreement by writing a dissenting
opinion. Following a panel’s decision, a majority of active judges on a circuit can vote to rehear the case in a
procedure known as en banc review. These reviews are rare, occurring in only about 1 percent of cases. This
rarity means that the judges of the Courts of Appeals will only want to invest their time in cases where they think
review is really worth it.
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In previous work we developed a formal theory in which judges use dissents to try to signal non-compliance to the
full circuit; that is, they act as judicial “whistleblowers.”  In this paper we test a key prediction of the whistleblower
theory–that certain types of judges will be more effective whistleblowers because their ideological preferences
make them more credible messengers of non-compliance. The idea is simple. If a judge who everyone expects to
agree with the majority based on his ideology nevertheless dissents, that dissent is a much stronger signal that
something inappropriate occurred than if a known ideological opponent dissents. Such dissents, which we call
counter-preference signals, should therefore be much more effective at triggering review by the full circuit.  We
find that counter-preference signals are indeed an important predictor of en banc review, a finding that sheds light
on the relationship between lower courts, judicial opinions, and the higher courts that oversee them. Specifically,
moving from a whistleblowing dissent written by an ideological opponent of the panel to one that is an ideological
ally raises the probability of en banc review from 3 to 17 percent, a striking result given the overall rarity of en
banc review. Intuitively, an implication of our finding is that a dissent by a moderately liberal judge from a liberal
ruling has a much bigger impact on a conservative circuit’s decision to review than a dissent by a like-minded
conservative.
Our whistleblower theory also predicts that whistleblowing dissents should be most effective at triggering review
when the panel and full circuit are ideologically distant. When the potential for noncompliance is greater, dissent is
more likely to indicate severe non-compliance. We find strong support for this prediction: the marginal effect of a
whistleblowing dissent is about 46 percentage points when panels and full circuits are distant, compared to about
three percentage points when they are close. Both this and the effect of counter preference signals are quite
striking, given the overall rarity of en banc review. Taken together, these results have important implications for
assessing the role of whistleblowers in the judicial hierarchy, and suggest ways forward for understanding
whistleblowing more broadly in other institutional contexts.
The article first appeared at the AJPS blog and is based on the paper “Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the
Judicial Hierarchy,” in the American Journal of Political Science.  
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